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NOTES
ORAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AT
"ROADSHOWS" AND IN OTHER SETTINGS:
ILLUSORY LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5?
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 19331 ('33 Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) to provide the investing public with adequate
information to make informed investment decisions. 3 The '33 and '34 Acts
reflect Congress' desire to protect the investor by requiring the effective
disclosure of material facts relevant to the sale of a security. 4 Specifically,
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).

3. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957) (basic purpose of Securities
Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) is distribution of adequate
and accurate information and periodic updating thereof concerning public issuers and securities
to create and maintain informed trading market); I L. Loss, SECUrIrIEs REGuLAToo 130-31 (2d
ed. 1961) (outlining purposes of '33 and '34 Act); see also infra note 4 (legislative history and
goals of '33 and 34 Acts).
4. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER &
E. MAHAR, LEGLAT vE HSTORY OF THE SEcuRITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURMTES EXCHMNGE

ACT OF 1934, item 17 (1973) (Congress passed '33 Act to give investor access to all material
facts regarding securities offerings); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1-5 (1933), reprinted
in 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHA, supra item 18 (Congress imposed registration and prospectus
requirements under '33 Act to eliminate pressure tactics in securities sales and to inform buyers
of material information about issue of security); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 752-53 (1975) (primary goal of '33 Act is disclosure of essential information about
security); 1 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 178 (aim of Congress in passing '33 Act was to inform
and protect investors while encouraging honest enterprise).
Congress intended the '34 Act to protect the investor by requiring companies that issue
securities traded on any national securities exchange to report information the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) deems necessary to safeguard the public interest.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1982); S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934), reprintedin 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra, item 17
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 792]. The '34 Act serves the dual purpose of protecting the
investing public and instilling confidence in free and honest securities markets by penalizing unfair transactions. See S. REP. No. 792, supra, at 1-5; Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 936 (1982); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (primary purpose of '34 Act is to replace philosophy of caveat
emplorwith philosophy of complete disclosure to prevent fraud and protect investors). Congress'
ultimate goal was the prevention of fraudulent and deceptive practices that might harm the investing public. See S. REP. No. 792, supra, at 12-13. Since the purpose of the '33 and '34 Acts
was to provide information to persons engaging in securities transactions, a suborinate goal that
courts infer from the securities laws is that Congress intended the Acts to protect only the careful
investor who avails himself of the information mandated by the statutory scheme. See Wheeler,
Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule lob-5: An Implied Defense to An Implied Remedy,
70 Nw. U. L. REv. 561, 587 (1975) (Congress intended securities laws for protection of careful
investor).
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the '33 Act requires an issuing company to register with the Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) any security that an issuer offers
to the public via the means of interstate commerce, unless a registration exemption for the offering exists under the Act.- Under the terms of the '33

Act, the issuer of a registered security also must give any purchaser a prospectus containing essential information embodied in the registration statement. 6
The '33 and '34 Acts impose liability for material misrepresentations or omissions made by an individual in the course of a transaction resulting in the
acquisition or sale of a security. 7 Most securities are sold through the oral
representations of a salesman rather than through a prospectus." Officials of
the issuing company, underwriters, or others involved in the distribution of
a security, therefore, may face a significant potential for liability under the
for oral misrepresentations made during the course of a
securities laws
"roadshow ' 9 or other sales contact with potential purchasers.
One provision of the securities laws that may establish civil liability for
5. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3, 4, 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d, 77e (1982) (registration
requirement and statutory exemptions from registration).
6. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1982) (unlawful to sell or deliver
security unless prospectus accompanies or precedes such security).
7. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1982) (civil liability
provisions for material misstatements or omissions); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (unlawful to use any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in violation of SEC rules); see also infra notes 10-11 (legislative history of § 10(b) and SEC rule
lOb-5); Note, Conflict Resolved: An Implied Remedy Under § lOb of the '34 Act Survives Despite
The Existence of Express Remedies, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1039, 1067 (1983) (congressional
goal of deterring fraud in securities market necessitates continued recognition of implied private
right of action under § 10(b) despite express remedies in '33 and '34 Acts).
8. See Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAw. 631, 635 (1973) (most
promotional issues sold by salesmen's oral presentations); see also Mann, Prospectuses:Unreadable
or Just Unread?-A Proposalto Reexamine Policies Against PermittingProjections, 40 GEo.
WAsH. L. R-v. 222, 223 (1971) (investors do not read prospectuses because prospectuses do not
contain information investors consider crucial to investment decision); Address by William J.
Casey to American Society of Business Writers, reprinted in SEc. Rao. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
100, at 1-3 (May 5, 1971) (disclosure requirements of securities laws unsatisfactory as long as
no one really reads prospectuses).
9. Interview with Robert P. Lancaster, Senior Vice President of Institutional Sales, Shearson, American Express, Dallas, Texas (April 10, 1984). A roadshow is a very polished presentation, conducted more or less in the manner of a press conference, in which company officials
and/or underwriters promote a new security offering. Id. The company officials, usually the
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, attempt to give some idea of where the
business is headed and what competitive advantages the company has. Id. The company officials
frequently are accompanied by counsel for the underwriter who is generally very careful about
what the company officials may say in their presentation. Id. While oral misrepresentations may
occur during roadshows, "the risks are inordinate to the benefits-if you misrepresent, you've
bought it back." Id.; see SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp 715, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (oral misrepresentations during sales meetings with wealthy investors); 5A A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE
UNDER RuLE lOb-5 § 64.01[b][ii], at 3-309 (2d ed. 1983) (division among courts concerning permissibility of "puffing" in securities sales); 6 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 3541-43 (puffing has
no place in securities transactions).

1984]

ORAL MISREPRESENTATIONS

997

oral misrepresentations is section 10(b)'0 of the '34 Act and its appurtenant
regulation, SEC rule 10b-5." To maintain a private cause of action for
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
Congress intended to grant the SEC board rule-making powers under § 10 to prevent future
abuses that Congress specifically did not prohibit. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 4, at 18;
Wheeler, supra note 4, at 565 (drafters of '34 Act gave Commission broad rule-making power
to combat unforseen deleterious practices). The drafters intended § 10(b) to serve as a "catchall
clause" to give the Commission authority to deal with new manipulative or fraudulent devices.
Hearingson H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), reprintedin 8 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note

4, item 23 (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran on behalf of drafters of § 10(b)). The House
of Representatives initially passed a bill giving the SEC power to regulate specific practices that
the bill proscribed, but delegating no authority to the Commission to regulate manipulative or
deceptive practices generally. See H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1934), reprinted in 10
J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHA, supra note 4, item 31. The Senate amended the bill and a con-

ference committee agreed to the language now in § 10 of the '34 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1838,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934), reprintedin 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAA, supra note 4,
item 20 (conference report). The legislative history discusses neither the reasons for the change
in the statutory language of § 10(b) nor the scope of § 10(b)'s "catchall" function. See S. REP.
No. 792, supra note 4, at 1-5; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1934), reprinted
in 5 J.ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 4, item 18 [hereinafter cited as H.R. RP. No.
1383]; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-04 (1976). Thus, courts should determine
the scope of § 10(b) by reference to the overall congressional intent in the '34 Act to prevent
manipulative or deceptive practices serving no useful purpose. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note
4, at 12-13; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra, at 10-11, 20-21; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). In 1942, the SEC exercised the authority that Congress
granted the Commission under the '34 Act and promulgated rule lob-5. See id; supra note 10
(congressional intent). Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Misrepresentations are actionable under rule lOb-5(b) which forbids any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security. See id. § 240.10b-5(b).
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misrepresentation under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,' 2 a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant, acting with scienter,"3 made a false representation of a
12. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (25 years of
precedent support maintaining private right of action under rule lOb-5). Congress probably did
not contemplate the creation of a substantive civil remedy under the '34 Act but rather intended
that the SEC handle violations of the statute and regulations through administrative disciplinary
actions. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule l0b-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?,
57 Nw. U. L. REv. 627, 642-60 (1963) (legislative history and statutory construction indicate
Congress did not intend implied right of action under § 10(b)); Note, Reliance Under Rule l0b-5:
Is The "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 562, 564 (1972) (Congress did
not intend to create private right of action under § 10(b)). But see S. REP. No. 792, supra note
4, at 6 (committee report includes § 10 in discussion of civil remedies). Nevertheless, the federal
courts have inferred a private cause of action under rule lob-5 and that right now is well settled.
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687 (1983); see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (recognizing private right of action); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (25 years of precedent support maintaining private
right of action under rule lOb-5); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (affirming private right of action); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Courts have inferred a private right of action under rule
lob-5 to compensate persons injured by violations of the rule and to enhance the rule's corrective
purposes. See Note, The Reliance Requirement In Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88
HAIRv. L. Rv. 584, 585, 606 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reliance Requirement ]; Wheeler, supra
note 4, at 585-86. Accordingly, courts intend private actions under rule lOb-5 to prevent fraud
rather than to serve as an "insurance policy for foolish investors." RelianceRequirement, supra,
at 606; see Wheeler, supra note 4, at 585 (courts promote anti-fraud policies of securities laws
and encourage market stability by requiring plaintiffs to invest carefully).
Courts fashioned the elements of a rule lob-5 private cause of action by referring to the
elements necessary to establish a common-law action for misrepresentation or deceit. See I A.
BROMBERG & L. LOWENELS, SEcuiaTES FRAtD & COMMODITES FRAUD, § 2.7(1), at 55 (1982);

3 L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1430-44. A common-law action for deceit requires a false representation of a material fact with knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false. See W. PROSSER, HAmBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
A plaintiff also must show that the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to act or not to
act on the basis of the defendant's misrepresentation and that damage resulted from his justifiable
reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§§ 525 (liability for fraudulent misrepresentation), 526 (scienter), 531 (intent to induce conduct),
53-7 (justifiable reliance), 538 (materiality) (1977); see generally Whalen, Causationand Reliance
in PrivateActions UnderSEC Rule 10b-5, 13 PAC. L.J. 1003, 1007-15 (1982) (extensive analysis
of relationship between common law misrepresentation action and rule lOb-5 action). One commentator notes that the courts have not restricted the scope of a private action under rule lOb-5
to the analogous common law proceeding but instead have used policy considerations to define
the action. Wheeler, supra note 4, at 583.
13. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (liability under rule lob-5
requires scienter rather than merely negligent conduct). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder the Court
held that § 10(b) requires a showing of the defendant's "scienter," a mental state that the Court
defined as including "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193-94 n.12. The Hochfelder
Court reserved the question of whether recklessness was sufficient to meet the scienter requirement under the statute. Id. Several federal courts of appeal, however, have held that recklessness
is a sufficiently culpable state of mind to satisfy the scienter requirement of § 10(b). See, e.g.,
White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (recklessness satisfied Hochfelder scienter
requirement under § 10(b)); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982) (same);
G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Mansbach
v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979) (same); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
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material fact' 4 in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 5 In addi16
tion, a plaintiff generally must show that he relied upon the misrepresentation
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus.
v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
875 (1977). Several courts have noted that reckless conduct under rule 10b-5 must involve an
extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642
F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (only "severe recklessness" meets scienter standard under rule
lOb-5), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,
545 (5th Cir. 1981) (extreme departure from ordinary standards of care), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), citing SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co.,
624 F.2d-1312, 1321 n.17 (5th Cir. 1980); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir.
1979) (same); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
14. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1976) (defining materiality). In
TSC Indus. v. Northway, the Supreme Court provided a definition of materiality in construing
§ 14(a) of the '34 Act. Id. The Court stated that a fact is material if a reasonable man would
find that fact important in determining whether or not to enter into a transaction. Id. at 445.
Courts have applied the materiality standard in Northway to rule 10b-5 actions as well. See,
e.g., SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying Northway definition of materiality in rule lOb-5 action); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 466
(7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Dower v. Mosser Indus., 648 F.2d 183,
187 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324,, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) (same);
Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1978) (same). If a defendant
falls to disclose information already actually known by the plaintiff, courts may treat that information as not material. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976).
Many courts confuse the concepts of reliance and materiality. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra
note 9, at § 64.01 [a], at 3-279 n.3 (confusion between reliance and materiality). Reliance concerns
whether a particular plaintiff believed and acted upon a misrepresentation while materiality involves whether a reasonable man would have acted upon the basis of a misrepresentation. See
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.) (materiality involves reasonable man
but reliance is subjective concept), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); 5A A. JAcows, supra note
9, § 64.01[a], at 3-279 & n.3 (same).
15. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952) (court formulated Birnbaum doctrine which provides that only actual purchasers or sellers may maintain action under rule lOb-5). The Supreme Court explicitly affirmed
the Birnbaum doctrine in Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
The Blue Chip Stamps court noted that the Birnbaum doctrine bars three classes of potential
plaintiffs. Id. at 737-38. These three classes include potential, but not actual, purchasers of shares;
shareholders who do not sell because of a misrepresentation; and shareholders, creditors, or others
related to an issuer who suffer a decrease in the value of their investment because of activities
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities that violate rule lOb-5. Id. Since the Birnbaum doctrine limits actions under rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers or sellers, courts should construe the statutory definitions of purchase and sale broadly to effectuate the antifraud purposes
of the '34 Act. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 38.02[a], at 2-84. See generally id. § 38.02[2]
(discussing transactions constituting purchase or sale).
16. See, e.g., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff must prove reliance); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975) (same);
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (same); see also Reliance
Requirement, supranote 12, at 589 (no need to presume reliance in affirmative misrepresentation
cases). The nature of the reliance requirement varies depending upon whether the fraudulent action
is a misrepresentation or a failure to disclose and upon the context of the transaction. See R.
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and that his reliance was the cause of the harm.17
Courts dealing with misrepresentations under rule lOb-5 have applied

several different standards to measure a plaintiff's reliance.' 8 Most courts
recognize that reliance under rule lob-5 encompasses both a plaintiff's actual
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcUrrIEs REGULATnoN-CASES AND MATEIAIS 1063 (4th ed. 1977) (analysis
of reliance necessitates distinguishing between affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosure,
private transactions and transactions in public market, and individual investment decisions and
collective action).
When a failure to disclose is the principal fraud, positive proof of reliance is not necessary.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 143-54 (1972). In a failure to disclose
case, a plaintiff must show only that a reasonable investor would have considered the facts important in determining whether to invest. Id. Nonreliance is an affirmative defense in nondisclosure
cases, however, since Affiliated Ute Citizens only creates a presumption of reliance. See Dwoskin
v. Rollins, Inc., 634 F.2d 285, 291-92 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981). Defendants may rebut evidence of
reliance by showing either that the plaintiff knew the representation was untrue at the time of
the transaction or that the plaintiff entered the transaction for other reasons. See R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, supra, at 1063-64.
17. See, e.g., Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 1980) (courts require proof of
causation in lob-5 actions); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Titan Group,
Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234,239 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). Materiality,
reliance, and causation are related but different concepts. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 9, §
64.02, at 3-324. The reason for the reliance requirement is to prove that the defendant's conduct
was the cause of a plaintiff's injury. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). If the misrepresentation is a "substantial factor" in
determining the plaintiff's course of conduct, that is a sufficient degree of reliance under the
subjective tests. See id. Thus, a misrepresentation may cause a plaintiff's harm even if the
misrepresentation is not the only or most important factor in determining his actions. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1976) (sufficient
for plaintiff to show misrepresentation was substantial or significant cause even if not sole cause);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102-03 (10th Cir.) (substantial factor satisfies
causal requirement), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); 5A A. JAcos, supra note 9, § 64.01 [b][ii],
at 3-294 & n.18 (courts and commentators have addressed degree of reliance necessary). Plaintiffs
should have no difficulty demonstrating in face-to-face transactions that a misrepresentation induced the investment decision. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supranote 16, at 1063. Materiality
involves whether a reasonable man would be justified in acting upon the representation. See 5A
A. JACOBs, supra note 9, § 64.02, at 3-324. Therefore, whether a plaintiff may show causation
rests upon a conclusion that the fact misrepresented was relevant to the investment decision.
See id. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that he relied on a material misrepresentation, he only
need show that the securities transaction rather than a general market decline or some other factor
was the cause of his economic loss. See Whalen, supra note 12, at 1016-17; cf. Holdsworth v.
Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976) (proof of reliance establishes chain of causation in
affirmative misrepresentation cases).
18. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 64.01 [b], at 3-281 (courts use constructive, subjective, and justifiable reliance standards). Constructive reliance applies in nondisclosure cases,
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), and many lower courts
have held that constructive reliance also is appropriate in misrepresentation cases involving a
large class of plaintiffs. See Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Prod., Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 638-39 (8th
Cir. 1979) (separate showing of reliance in proxy solicitation materials unnecessary); Herbst v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1315-16 (2d Cir. 1974) (proof of individual reliance
unnecessary in class action); 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 64.01[b][i], at 3-288 (constructive
reliance appropriate when misrepresentations involve large class). When constructive reliance is
available, some courts allow a defendant to show only that the plaintiffs as a class could not
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reliance and the justifiability of that reliance.1 9 Actual reliance involves a subjective determination of whether a particular plaintiff in fact believed that
a misleading statement was true. 20 A majority of courts dealing with
misrepresentations under rule lOb-5 also have employed a subjective standard
in determining the justifiability of a plaintiff's reliance. 21 Although the circuits have not been consistent in their analysis of the justifiability of a plaintiff's reliance, 22 the courts have indicated that a plaintiff has some level of
duty whether phrased in terms of "justifiable reliance" 23 or due diligence.24
rely on the misrepresentation because of sophistication or other factors. See Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265, 269 (3d Cir.) (fact that class representative may have
had knowledge is no defense), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); 5A A. JACOBS supra note 9,
§ 64.01[b][i], at 3-286-87. Other courts, however, permit a defendant to disprove the reliance
of any or all plaintiffs. See, e.g., Keiman v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788-90 (9th Cir.
1980) (court permits defendant to disprove reliance of one plaintiff); Little v. First Cal. Co.,
532 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant may rebut reliance in open market situation); Carrus v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975) (broker may prove lack of reliance).
Justifiable reliance measures a plaintiff's conduct using a reasonable man standard. See
5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 9, § 64.01 [b] [ill], at 3-319. To show justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish that a reasonable man would have believed the misrepresentation. Id. Courts frequently use the term "justifiable reliance" when they really mean materiality
or due diligence. Id. at 3-320-21. Justifiable reliance as a reasonable man standard probably does
not survive the Hochfelder decision. See id. at 3-321-22; supra note 13 (discussing Hochfelder);
see also infra note 25 and accompanying text ("justifiable reliance" is subjective concept).
19. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.) (plaintiff must show both actual
reliance and justifiability of reliance to recover under rule IOb-5), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Gaskins v. Grosse, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,105, at 95,277 (S.D. Ga.
1983) (reliance aspect includes extent of actual reliance by plaintiff and justifiability of reliance
in rule lOb-5 case).
20. See Gaskins v. Grosse, [Current] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 99,105, at 95,277 (S.D.
Ga. 1983) (actual reliance means plaintiff would not have invested if he had known truth); 5A
A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 64.01[b][ii], at 3-292 (whether plaintiff actually believed statement
was true).
21. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 64.01 [b][ii], at 3-291 (subjective reliance appropriate
when constructive reliance not applicable); see also Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588
F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978) ("reasonable reliance"); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687,
695 (10th Cir. 1976) ("justifiable reliance").
22. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.) (treatment of justifiability of plaintiff's reliance varies greatly among circuits), cert. denied 434 U.S. 911 (1977); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECuRImEs RaGULATION 1127 (1983) (courts impose some sort of duty on plaintiff
but use different labels) [hereinafter cited as FuNDAmENTALS]; Wheeler, supra note 4, at 563 n.7
(courts employ different terminology in requiring plaintiff to show his "due care").
23. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983) (justifiable reliance);
Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (same), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); FtDAMElrras, supra note 22, at 1127 (courts speak of justifiable
reliance to show plaintiff's duty).
24. See First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977) (due diligence
requires plaintiff to examine available information), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Hirsch
v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977) (sophisticated investor must investigate to satisfy
due diligence standard); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1022 (5th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff's principal duty is to seek available information to uncover fraud); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976) (flexible due diligence standard requires only that plaintiff act
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Justifiable reliance concerns whether a plaintiff's reliance on a defendant's
misrepresentations was reasonable and justifiable given the relationship of the
parties and the particular factual climate of each case. 25 The due diligence
concept, on the other hand, is simply a judicially imposed limitation on a
plaintiff's ability to recover that requires a plaintiff to investigate to some
extent the truthfulness of a defendant's statements." Since a private plaintiff
reasonably); E.H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 642 (D. Minn. 1979) (same).
But see Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (recklessness may bar
plaintiff's recovery, but due diligence not applicable after Hochfelder), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1123 (1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040, 1048 (7th Cir.) (no
due diligence defense), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687,
692-94 (10th Cir. 1976) (recklessness or gross conduct bar plaintiff's recovery, but due diligence
no longer exists after Hochfelder), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). Some courts address the
plaintiff's requirement of due diligence as an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case, but
other courts treat due diligence as an affirmative defense for the defendant to raise. See Note,
A Reevaluation Of The Due DiligenceRequirement ForPlaintiffsIn PrivateActions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 1978 Wisc. L. REv. 904, 905-06 (1978). Some courts, however, treat due diligence
as part of the proof of other elements of a plaintiff's case, such as reliance. See id.; Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981) (reasonable reliance contemplates subjective reliance tempered by plaintiff's due diligence), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
A due diligence requirement promotes two distinct policies. First, general principles of equity
should bar those who have not pursued their own interests with care and good faith. See Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). Second, courts promote market stability and the anti-fraud aspects of the securities laws by requiring plaintiffs to
exercise care in investing. See id.; see also Reliance Requirement, supra note 12, at 604 (purpose
of due diligence is to deter investor carelessness in securities transactions).
25. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983) (courts examine all
relevant factors to determine whether reliance justifiable in factual situation); Holdsworth v. Strong,
545 F.2d 687, 697 (10th Cir. 1976) (reliance on misrepresentations reasonable and justifiable given
facts of case). Courts determine the justifiability of a plaintiff's reliance by examining, inter alia,
the plaintiff's sophistication and expertise in securities transactions, the relationship between the
parties, access of the parties to the relevant information, and the general or specific nature of
the misrepresentations. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1516 (citing factors relevant
in determining whether plaintiff's reliance was justifiable); G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge,
636 F.2d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's due diligence evaluated in light of fiduciary relationships, concealment or ability to detect fraud, and plaintiff's sophistication and financial expertise); Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978) (availability of
information and plaintiff's knowledge and experience are factors to consider in determining
reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff's sophistication and opportunity to uncover fraud, fiduciary or long-standing relationships, and access to relevant information worthy of court's consideration); Hughes v. DempseyTegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 176-77 (9th Cir.) (general or specific nature of representation is
consideration in assessing plaintiff's reliance on information), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
26. See Note, The Due Diligence RequirementForPlaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DuKE
L.J. 753, 754-55 (1975) (plaintiff must investigate advisability of transaction and use common
sense in evaluating available information) [hereinafter cited as Due Diligence]. Due diligence is
a subjective standard and the degree of investigation necessary therefore varies according to the
individual characteristics of a particular plaintiff. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023
(5th Cir.) (court should examine plaintiff's physical and mental condition and other commitments),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). Since the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976), held that a defendant could not be liable for merely negligent conduct, many courts have
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after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder2 must show that a defendant acted with
scienter to establish a rule lOb-5 claim,18 most courts will not bar a plaintiff's
recovery for mere negligence but rather will bar a plaintiff's recovery only
if he acted in a reckless manner or intentionally disregarded risks he knew
or should have known in entering into the securities transaction. 9
Conceptually, an oral misrepresentation is indistinguishable from other
misrepresentations under rule lOb-5. As a practical matter, the requirements
of reliance and due diligence on the part of the plaintiff are the most difficult
to establish in a rule lOb-5 action for an oral misrepresentation because of
the subjective nature of those requirements. 30 Courts have addressed the reliance
and due diligence requirements in two analytically distinct situations in which
oral misrepresentations may create a potential for liability on the part of those
persons engaging in securities transactions. First, an individual who makes
an oral misrepresentation may be liable even when a potential plaintiff has
access to accurate information when he invests or sells.3 1 Alternatively, an
individual who makes an oral misrepresentation also may be liable when
available to an investor or seller at the
accurate information is not otherwise
2
time of his investment or sale. 3
reconsidered the circumstances under which a plaintiff should be barred from recovery. See Mallis
v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Holdsworth
v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). The effect
of Hochfelder is to bring rule lob-5 actions closer to an intentional tort action. See 545 F.2d
at 693. As in the case of tort law, the securities laws are intended to deter intentional misconduct.
See supra note 4 (legislative goals of '33 and '34 Acts). Lack of care on the part of a person
injured by an intentional misrepresentation is irrelevant at common law so long as the representation is not patently false. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 108. Consequently, the courts, by
analogy, have concluded that the mere negligence of a plaintiff is not a defense to a rule lob-5
action since the negligence of a plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort. See Mallis v.
Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1980) (recklessness but not negligence may bar plaintiff's recovery under rule IOb-5), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048-49 (7th Cir.) (negligent conduct will not bar recovery for
intentional actions), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1013-24
(5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693
(10th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). But see Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff must act "reasonably" under circumstances).
27. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
28. See supra note 13 (analysis of Hochfelder scienter standard).
29. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1983) (most courts hold
that plaintiff must not intentionally or recklessly disregard known or obvious risks); Gower v.
Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1156 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); supranote 26 (recklessness but not negligence
may bar plaintiff's recovery).
30. See Due Diligence, supra note 26, at 754-57 (bars to plaintiff's recovery under rule
l0b-5); supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (discussion of reliance and due diligence). In
addition to reliance and due diligence, courts also have used the concepts of waiver, laches, and
estoppel to deny recovery to a plaintiff. Due Diligence, supra note 26, at 755.
31. See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 1976) (defendant liable despite
plaintiff's access to information). But see Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th
Cir. 1983) (plaintiff barred from recovery because no justifiable reliance).
32. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (oral misrepresentations without access
to accurate information).
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When a plaintiff has access to accurate information, a court may bar a
plaintiff's recovery because of his failure to act in a justifiable manner or
to exercise due diligence.33 Thus, a plaintiff must read or investigate to some
extent the information available to him.34 Even in an environment of complete disclosure, however, an oral misrepresentation may cause a person to
discount the other information available to him and instead cause him to rely
subjectively upon the oral misrepresentation.35 That accurate information was
available and known to a plaintiff should not necessarily bar his recovery if
he relied justifiably on the oral misrepresentation because of his relationship
with the defendant or because of other factual circumstances rendering his
36
reliance reasonable.
In contrast, a plaintiff also may rely solely upon a defendant's oral
misrepresentation and not investigate or avail himself of the correct information open to him. In some situations in which a plaintiff fails to utilize available
information, a court may consider that plaintiff to have constructive knowledge
of the information.37 Thus, considering the plaintiff's constructive knowledge
of the available information for purposes of determining the justifiability of
the plaintiff's reliance, a court may preclude the plaintiff from recovery under
rule 10b-5. 3 8 The parameters within which a court will impute knowledge to
a plaintiff under rule 10b-5 are not clear .3
In Holdsworth v. Strong,40 for example, the plaintiffs relied on a defendant's oral misrepresentations while failing to use accurate information available
to them. 41 The plaintiffs in Holdsworth sold their shares in a closely held corporation to the defendant, another shareholder, on the basis of the defendant's oral misrepresentations.42 The defendant represented that the corporation's financial condition was declining when in fact the company was increasing
33. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (justifiable reliance and due diligence

as bars to plaintiff's recovery).
34. See 5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 9, § 64.01[b][ii], at 3-319 (plaintiff must investigate).
35. See 3 A. BROMBERO & L. LowiENsts, supra note 12, § 8.4 (651) (2), at 204.246 (plaintiff may rely an oral misrepresentation even with complete disclosure).

36. See id.; cf. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983). In Zobrist,
the plaintiff relied on the defendant's oral misrepresentations despite specific contrary warnings
in a private placement memorandum. See id. at 1514. The Zobrist court, however, correctly determined that the court should not bar the plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff had a valid reason

for relying on the defendant. See id. at 1518. The court concluded that the plaintiff's reliance
was not justifiable. Id.
37. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983) (court will impute
knowledge of materials required by statute or regulations); infra notes 76-81 and accompanying
text (discussion of constructive notice). Constructive knowledge is knowledge that a person should

know rather than what he actually does know. See 2 A. BROmBERO & L. LowEN-rLs, supra note
12, § 8.4 (531).
38. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1518 (only consequences of imputing knowledge

is that court considers information imputed in determining justifiability of plaintiff's reliance).
39. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussion of constructive notice).
40. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
41. Id. at 692.
42. Id. at 689-90.
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its earning capability. 3 The plaintiffs sought recission of the sale, but the defendant claimed that the plaintiffs, as corporate insiders, did not exercise due
diligence because they had access to the corporate books and records but did
not investigate."
The Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth rejected the practice of requiring a plaintiff to exercise due diligence.4 5 Noting the similarity between the common law
torts of intentional misrepresentation or deceit and a private claim under rule
10-5 after Hochfelder,"6 the Holdsworth court held that an intentional actor
should not escape liability because of a plaintiff's failure to exercise due
diligence. 7 The court stated that application of the due diligence standard
to a plaintiff was roughly equivalent to contributory negligence, and therefore
a plaintiff's lack of due diligence should not be a defense to an intentional
wrong."' The Holdsworth court concluded that only gross misconduct on the
part of a plaintiff, similar in nature to that of the defendant, will bar a plaintiff's recovery under rule lOb-5."9
Despite rejecting the due diligence concept, the Holdsworth court nevertheless held that a plaintiff must establish that his reliance on a misrepresentation was justifiable. 5 The court in Holdsworth reasoned that the plaintiffs'
reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations was justifiable because of the
long personal and business association between the parties which amounted
to a quasi-fiduciary relationship. 5 ' In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs were preoccupied with other pursuits and lacked any notice that the defendant was not dealing with them honestly.52 Thus, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs could rely justifiably on the defendant's misrepresentations given
the particular factual circumstances, despite the plaintiff's access to the
corporate books and records.5
Although the Holdsworth court did not charge the plaintiffs with constructive knowledge of the contents of the corporate books and records, the

43. Id.

44. Id. at 692.
45. Id. at 694.
46. See supra notes 13 & 26 (relationship of private action under rule lOb-5 and common-

law fraud after Hochfelder).
47. 545 F.2d at 693-94. The court in Holdiworth v. Strong observed that neither the language

in § 10(b) nor in rule lOb-5 suggests the applicability of due diligence to any greater extent than
in a common-law fraud action. Id. at 694.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 693; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (most courts only bar plaintiff's

recovery for intentional or reckless behavior).
50. 545 F.2d at 695. In addressing the issue of due diligence, the Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth
stated that Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), necessitated a reevaluation
of the standard. 545 F.2d at 693. The court noted that if a plaintiff's contributory fault is to
bar recovery for a defendant's intentional conduct, the plaintiff's conduct should be gross conduct comparable to that of the defendant. Id.

51. Id. at 697.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Tenth Circuit in Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc." did impute knowledge of a private
placement memorandum to the plaintiffs." The defendants in Zobrist offered
interests in a limited partnership venture to "sophisticated" investors." Each
plaintiff signed a statement indicating that he had read a memorandum detailing the risks involved in the investment although in reality none of the plain-

tiffs ever actually read the memorandum."
On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' reliance on the oral

misrepresentations could not be justifiable as a matter of law because the
memorandum expressly warned of the risks involved in the investment. S The
plaintiffs contended, however, that the court should not allow the defendants
to mitigate the effect of their misrepresentations by using "boiler plate" warnings as a shield while making fraudulent representations to potential investors."
The Tenth Circuit stated in Zobrist that a court should determine whether

reliance is justifiable on the basis of all relevant factors. 60 The court held that
it would charge investors who fail to read documents mandated by statute

or regulation with constructive knowledge of the contents of those documents."
The Zobrist court reasoned that once it imputed knowledge of the information in the memorandum to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' oral misrepresentations could not be justified as a matter of law. 2 Noting
that the memorandum expressly contradicted the defendants' oral representations, the court stated that the plaintiffs would have to show compelling reasons
63
to justify their reliance on the representations without further investigation.
54. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 1518. In Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., the defendant offered interests in the limited
partnership pursuant to § 4(2) of the '33 Act, exempting transactions not involving a public offering from the registration requirements of the '33 Act. Id. at 1514; see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
Rule 146 of the SEC, promulgated under § 4(2) of the '33 Act, required that each offeree in
an exempt offering receive the same type of information that an investor would receive in a prospectus in a non-exempt offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981) (rescinded at 47 Fed. Reg.
11261 (1982)). The private placement memorandum in Zobrist thus was the equivalent of a prospectus, except that the SEC had not reviewed the memorandum as they would a prospectus.
708 F.2d at 1514 n.3.
56. 708 F.2d at 1514.
57. Id. The jury in Zobrist found that the two officers of the defendant company knowingly violated rule lob-5 by making oral misrepresentations to one of the plaintiffs. Id at 1515.
The jury further determined that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendants' misrepresentations and therefore found the defendants liable. Id.
58. Id. at 1516.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1517; see supra note 25 (listing several factors courts consider relevant in determining plaintiff's justifiable reliance).
61. 708 F.2d at 1518.
62. Id.
63. Id. In SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the defendant made
various oral misrepresentations concerning tax advantages and prospective profits during sales
meetings with wealthy investors. The court held that the defendant's statements were merely
"puffing" upon which the investors could not and obviously did not rely. Id. The court based
its conclusion on the grounds that the defendant's offering circulars and prospectuses explicitly
warned of the investment risks. Id.
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As an example of a possible justification, the court cited the existence of a

longstanding business or personal association with the defendant which, the
court observed, did not exist in Zobrist." The Zobrist court concluded that
the plaintiffs had no valid reason for relying on the defendants' general
misrepresentations of risk in light of the specific warnings in the
memorandum."
While the Tenth Circuit rejected the concept of requiring a plaintiff to
exercise due diligence in Holdsworth and Zobrist," the court merely applied
a virtually identical requirement under the rubric of justifiable reliance.67 In
both Holdsworth and Zobrist the court examined the actions of the plaintiffs
in light of the particular circumstances of the case and the characteristics of
each plaintiff. 68 The Zobrist court also specifically observed that a plaintiff
may have to engage in further investigation or inquiry to justify his reliance
on a defendant's representations. 69 The Tenth Circuit's subjective approach
to justifiable reliance is practically indistinguishable from that of other courts

a due diligence test after Hochfelder to measure a
that ontinue to employ
7
plaintiff's conduct. 0
Under either the justifiable reliance or the due diligence caption, the courts
almost uniformly bar a plaintiff's recovery under rule 1Ob-5 only if he recklessly
or intentionally ignores factors that indicate he should not rely on the defendant's representations. 7 1 Using the "reckless or intentional" standard to limit
64. 708 F.2d at 1518.
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 45 & 63 and accompanying text (Holdsworth and Zobrist courts rejected due diligence requirement for plaintiffs under rule 10b-5).
67. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 64.01[b][iii], at 3-320 (courts use term "justifiable
reliance" to describe due diligence standard).
68. See supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (description and analysis of Holdsworth
and Zobrist decisions).
69. 708 F.2d at 1518.
70. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977). In Dupuy v. Dupuy, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff satisfied the due diligence
requirement despite being a corporate insider. Id. at 1020. The plaintiff relied on the oral
misrepresentations of the defendant, his brother, concerning the financial worth of stock in a
closely held corporation. Id. at 1021. Assessing the due diligence of the plaintiff, the court relied
on the plaintiff's repeated discussions about the stock with his brother before selling to him,
the plaintiff's limited time and access to information, and the plaintiff's increasing physical debilitation. Id. at 1023. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that "a jury could find justification" for the plaintiff's conduct. Id.
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (most courts only bar plaintiff's recovery
if he recklessly or intentionally disregards known or obvious risks). In Hirsch v. Du Pont, 553
F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit barred the plaintiffs from recovery under rule
1Ob-5 because the plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence to obtain the magnitude of the defendant company's capital deficiency. The court stated that the plaintiffs received all requested information from the defendant and that a reasonable investor of the plaintiffs' level of sophistication would have made further inquiries. Id. at 762-63. However, the Hirsch court based its decision on the determination that neither the defendant stock exchange nor the defendant accounting firm had a duty to disclose information to the plaintiffs. Id. at 762.
The Hirsch decision's treatment of a plaintiff's due diligence runs contrary to the vast majority
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a plaintiff's ability to recover comports with the purposes of section 10(b)
as expressed by Congress and of rule lOb-5 as interpreted by the courts."
Although the courts effectively insulate some defendants from liability by
employing the "reckless or intentional" standard to measure a plaintiff's conduct, the possibility that the SEC will initiate civil or criminal proceedings
against those who violate rule lOb-5 should be sufficient to deter fraudulent
conduct in these types of securities transactions." Moreover, investor carelessness is discouraged by the "reckless or intentional" limitation under the
justifiable reliance or due diligence requirements.74 Thus, in the context of
oral misrepresentations, a plaintiff may demonstrate the justifiability of his
reliance as long as the factual circumstances do not reveal that the plaintiff
recklessly or intentionally ignored indications that he should not rely on the
defendant's representations."
A plaintiff may have difficulty demonstrating the justifiability of his
reliance, however, if a court imputes knowledge of available information to
him.76 The Zobrist court specifically limited the circumstances in which it would
impute knowledge of the contents of documents to a plaintiff to those situations in which an investor fails to read material mandated by statute or
regulation. 77 Thus, the failure of the Holdsworth court to impute knowledge
of the contents of corporate books and records to the plaintiffs is in accord
with the treatment of constructive notice delineated in Zobrist." Other courts,
however, have charged investors with knowledge of any publicly available
information. 79 This extension of constructive notice is reasonable in the conof authority after Hochfelder. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit
subsequently limited Hirsch to its facts and instead stated that a plaintiff need not establish due
care but only negate recklessness when a defendant places the matter in issue. See Mallis v. Bankers
Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. See supra notes 10 & 12 (congressional intent regarding § 10(b) and goals of courts
interpreting rule 10b-5).
73. See Wheeler, supra note 4, at 586-88 (criminal and administrative sanctions pursued
by SEC deter fraudulent conduct in securities transactions).
74. Cf. id. (existence of due diligence defense encourages investor care); see infra note 77
(failure to impute knowledge of documents required by securities statutes would defeat legislative
purpose and create insurance for foolish investors).
75. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (analysis of justifiability of plaintiff's
reliance).
76. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1518 (10th Cir. 1983); supra notes 54-65 and
accompanying text (discussion of Zobrist decision).
77. 708 F.2d at 1518. The failure of a court to impute knowledge of statutory documents
provided to a plaintiff would defeat the subordinate goal of ensuring investor care in regard
to a securities offering. See supra note 4 (courts infer subordinate goal of securities laws of protecting only careful investors). Rather than placing the investor and the person offering the security
for sale on an equal footing, allowing a plaintiff to rely on oral representations while ignoring
accurate information in statutorily mandated documents merely would create an insurance policy
for foolish investors. See Reliance Requirement, supra note 12, at 606.
78. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983) (court will only charge
plaintiffs with constructive knowledge of documents required by statute or regulation under securities
laws). But see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
79. See Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff must
use any information available to him or court will impute knowledge of that information to him).
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text of rule lOb-5 only if the policy of imputing knowledge of the information
serves to deter investor carelessness. 0 While the Zobrist decision's limitation
of constructive notice to those documents mandated by statute or regulation
provides a sound guideline, the courts nevertheless may wish to leave some
latitude for special circumstances in which imputing knowledge to a plaintiff
is necessary to prevent the securities laws from becoming an insurance scheme
for careless investors. 8'
Once a court imputes knowledge of available information to a plaintiff,
the court then must determine whether the plaintiff's reliance was justifiable
in light of that knowledge. 2 A plaintiff claiming reliance on an oral
misrepresentation may have an almost insurmountable burden to prove the
justifiability of that reliance when a court imputes knowledge of other information available to him. 8 3 Absent particular circumstances creating a special
relationship or some other reason to rely on a defendant's oral representations, constructive knowledge of mandated documents or other available information will preclude
recovery under rule lob-5 on the basis of the oral
4
misrepresentations.
On the other hand, a plaintiff who did not have access to accurate information faces a substantially lighter burden in proving the justifiability of his
reliance than a plaintiff that had access to accurate information at the time
of his investment or sale. 5 A plaintiff may not have had access to correct
information either because a prospectus or other written document also contained misrepresentations 6 or because the information was not ascertainable. 7
80. See supra note 4 (courts have established subordinate goal under rule lOb-5 of deterring
investor carelessness). Obviously, imputing knowledge to a plaintiff would not serve to deter
fraudulent practices by defendants. Therefore, if constructive notice is to serve any purpose other
than limiting private actions, constructive notice must serve to deter investor carelessness to relate
to the goals of the securities laws. See supra note 4 (legislative and judicial purposes under §
10(b) and rule lOb-5).
81. See supra note 80 (purpose of imputing knowledge to plaintiffs); see also Jackson v.
Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corporate "insider" normally can not recover
against other insiders since both have equal access to information); 5A A. JACOBs, supra note
9, § 64.01[b][ii], at 3-316 n.106 (same). Jackson v. Oppenheim suggests that the court should
have charged the plaintiffs in Holdsworth with constructive knowledge of the corporate books

since the plaintiffs did not show that the books were unavailable. See 545 F.2d at 696. The
Holdsworth court notes, however, that the corporate books would not have revealed the defendant's false representations. Id. at 697. Thus, accurate information was not available to the plaintiffs
which indicates that the court should not have barred the plaintiffs' recovery on that basis alone.

See infra note 90 (court should not bar recovery if falsity of representation unascertainable).
82. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (analysis of situations when plaintiffs do
not have access to accurate information).

86. See Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978) (defendant's oral misrepresentations affirmed by later oral and written misrepresentations made by others).
87. Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F. Supp. 1365, 1383 (D. R.I. 1977) (plaintiffs lacked effective

access to information about fraud), modified, 583 F.2d 542 (Ist Cir. 1978); see also Hackbart
v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff could not have learned true nature
of affairs until too late to affect investment decision).
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Thus, because the information is either inaccurate or unavailable, courts do
not charge plaintiffs with constructive notice of that information.8" Regardless
of the reason a plaintiff does not have access to accurate information, most
courts hold that a plaintiff is not required to investigate sources from outside
the corporation 9 and should not be barred from recovery if the falsity of
the representation is unascertainable.9 °
In addressing a situation in which information was not available to a plaintiff, the Third Circuit in Straub v. Vaisman & Co. 9' held that the plaintiffs
satisfied their obligation of due diligence despite the plaintiffs' sophistication
and experience in the securities industry. 92 Relying on the defendants'
misrepresentations and omissions, the plaintiffs purchased a substantial number
of shares of a particular stock.93 Less than a month later, the issuing company filed bankruptcy proceedings.9" Noting that the plaintiffs neither requested
a prospectus nor investigated the status of the issuer, the defendants contended

that the plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence before purchasing the securities
and therefore should be barred from recovery. 95
In addressing the due diligence issue, the Straub court decided that a plaintiff's lack of diligence by failing to investigate or inquire about a defendant's
representations in a securities transaction was only one element in analyzing
a plaintiff's conduct under rule 10b-5. 96 The court noted that a plaintiff's duty
of care requires simply that the plaintiff act reasonably under the
circumstances. 97 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that courts should
88. See supranotes 86-88 and accompanying text (information inaccurate or unascertainable).
89. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1023 (5th Cir.) (plaintiff need not investigate
sources outside corporation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); 5A A. JAcoas, supra note 9,
§ 64.01 [b][ii], at 3-316 & n. 102 (due diligence does not require investigation outside of corporation).
90. See Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974) (inability to ascertain truth of statement does not preclude recovery under rule lOb-5); Holmes v. Bateson, 434
F. Supp. 1365, 1383 (D. R.I. 1977) (lack of access to information about fraud does not bar
action), modified, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1978); 5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 9, § 64.01[b][ii], at
3-315 & n.100 (lack of any diligence should not preclude recovery if information unascertainable).
91. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
92. Id. at 598.
93. Id. at 594.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 596. The defendants in Straub asserted that a minimal inquiry by the plaintiffs
would have revealed that the security was not a new issue and indicated the security's actual
market price. Id.
96. Id. at 597. See Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir.
1978) (courts must consider all factors); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696-97 (10th Cir.
1976) (no one factor is determinative). The Third Circuit in Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d
591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976), stated that courts should balance the common law notion that a negligent
plaintiff nevertheless may recover for an intentional tort against the underlying policies of the
securities laws in preventing fraud and investor carelessness. Id.; see supra note 4 (legislative
intent behind '33 and '34 Acts).
97. 540 F.2d at 598. The Third Circuit in Straub held that the duty of due care is a flexible
concept. Id. The court considered that such factors as fiduciary relationship, opportunity to detect
a misrepresentation, plaintiff's sophistication, length of business or personal relationships, and
access to relevant information merit consideration. Id.
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determine whether a plaintiff's lack of diligence was reasonable given the factual
situation. 9 Although one of the plaintiffs in Straub was a sophisticated investor, the court explicitly observed that the plaintiffs did not have access
to information about the issuer's plans to file for bankruptcy and that the
defendants planned the transaction to occur over a holiday season to limit
the plaintiffs opportunity to investigate. 99 The court therefore found that the
plaintiffs satisfied the requirement of acting reasonably under the circumstances
since the information was not available.'
Notwithstanding that the Straub court based its decision on the individual
characteristics of the plaintiffs and gave considerable weight to the plaintiffs'
inability to acquire accurate information concerning the transaction, 01 the due
diligence requirement that plaintiffs act reasonably under the circumstances
provides little guidance to a plaintiff seeking to justify his reliance on a defendant's misrepresentations." 2 The reasonableness standard in Straub is one
usually associated with negligence and thus seems contrary to the standard
in other circuits requiring a plaintiff to act in reckless or intentional disregard
of known or obvious risks to bar a plaintiff's recovery under rule lOb-5." 3
If accurate information is not available, the presence or absence of a plaintiff's inquiries concerning a defendant's oral misrepresentations should be
irrelevant when the representations are not obviously false and when the plaintiff has no notice of any inaccuracy on the part of the defendant." 4
Another possibility that a plaintiff relying on a defendant's oral
misrepresentations may encounter is when other information is available but
also proves inaccurate. In Gaskinsv. Grosse,'11 the defendant offered employment to one of the plaintiffs subject to the requirement that the plaintiff pur10 6
chase a specified amount of common stock in the defendant's company.
The plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer on the basis of a series of oral
misrepresentations by the defendant concerning the financial condition and
dividend and salary policies of the company.'0 7 In investigating the defendant's
representations, the plaintiff acquired erroneous financial reports on the company that supported the defendant's position.10 ' Further, the plaintiff requested
98. Id.
99. Id. The Straub court observed that a long standing business relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant allowed the defendant to make the transaction without fear of investigation by the plaintiff. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. See Note, supra note 24, at 912-13 (Straubcourt uses standard of reasonableness which
is term usually identified with negligence concepts); supra note 29 and accompanying text ("reckless
or intentional" standard for due diligence or justifiable reliance predominates).
104. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 9, § 64.01 [b][ii], at 3-316-17 & nn. 105-06 (if plaintiff
has notice of error or statement is obviously false, plaintiff can not show reliance).
105. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,105, at 95, 270 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
106. Id. at 95,272.
107. Id. at 95,272, 95,276.
108. Id. at 95,272.
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access to the corporate books but the defendant claimed that the books were
with an auditor. 109 After assuming his new position with the company, the
plaintiff discovered the defendant's misrepresentations.'1
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held
that the plaintiff did not recklessly disregard risks that should have been
apparent, and therefore, the court did not bar the plaintiff from recovery under
rule l0b-5.1" The Gaskins court observed that the financial reports comported
with the defendant's misrepresentations." 2 Thus, since the available information also was inaccurate, the court found that the plaintiff made adequate
inquiries regarding the defendant and his business to establish the justifiability
of his reliance. 1 3 Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiff did not
have access to inside information from the company such as the corporate
books." 4
Although the inquiries of the plaintiff in Gaskins were adequate to establish
the justifiability of his reliance, the Gaskins decision illustrates the dangers
to a plaintiff of failing to engage in any type of inquiry about his investment
or sale.' 5 While Straub indicates that a court will not bar a plaintiff's recovery
under rule 10b-5 when accurate information simply is not available," 16 Gaskins
confirms that a court nevertheless may require a plaintiff to show some reason
his reliance on a defendant's oral representations was justifiable."1 Thus, the
plaintiffs' reliance in Straub, for example, was justifiable because of their
longstanding business relationship with the defendants and because the transaction occurred during a period when investigation was not possible." ' A plaintiff holds a significant advantage when accurate information is not available
since he only must show that he justifiably relied on a defendant's representation rather than that he justifiably relied on a defendant's oral representation
over a contrary representation." 9 The approach delineated in the Straub and
Gaskins decisions, therefore, achieves the purpose of the securities laws by
deterring fraud without sacrificing the subordinate goal of deterring investor
carelessness. 20
109. Id.
110. Id. 95,273.
111. Id.at 95,278.
112. Id. at 95,272 n.2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
116. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff acted reasonably
since information not available); supra notes 96-104 (holding and analysis of Straub).
117. See Gaskins, 99,105, at 95,278; see also White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1369 (1 th
Cir. 1982) (reasonable person could find investor reckless for failing to read any literature before
investing).
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (factors justifying reliance in Straub).
119. Compare Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976) (long relationship
with defendant and no information available) with Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518
(10th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's reliance on defendant's oral representations over written contrary
representations in private placement memorandum not justified absent special circumstances).
120. See supranote 4 (congressional and judicial purposes underlying § 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
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Courts have inferred a private right of action under section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5 to deter fraudulent misrepresentations and to encourage investor
care in securities transactions.' 2 ' Individuals who make oral misrepresentations, therefore, face liability under rule lOb-5 if a plaintiff can establish that
his reliance on the misrepresentations was justifiable under all of the circumstances when the other elements of a cause of action under rule lOb-5
are present.' 22 If a plaintiff has access to accurate information, a court will
not bar his recovery unless he recklessly or intentionally ignores indications
that he should not rely on a defendant's oral misrepresentations.' 23 However,
if a plaintiff should have been aware of other information contrary to a defendant's oral representations, courts under certain circumstances will impute
knowledge of that information to the plaintiff thereby defeating his claim of
justifiable reliance.' 24 On the other hand, when a plaintiff does not have access
to accurate information, either because the information is inaccurate or unascertainable, a plaintiff faces a substantially lighter burden of proof. 25 A plaintiff still must demonstrate the justifiability of his reliance but no contrary
representation is present for the plaintiff to overcome. 16 Accordingly, any
person engaged in securities transactions should be wary that potential liability
exists for oral misrepresentations when the factual circumstances provide some
basis for a plaintiff's reliance on those misrepresentations. Nevertheless, the
inability of a plaintiff to justify his reliance on a defendant's oral misrepresentations frequently, if not usually, will render a defendant immune from liability
27
under rule lOb-5.1
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121. See id. (courts infer congressional intent to protect only careful investors); supra note

10 (§ 10(b) enacted to give SEC power to combat unforseen fraudulent practices); supra note
12 (courts have inferred private right of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to enhance corrective
purposes of rule but not to serve as investor's insurance policy).
122. See supra notes 12-29 (explaining requirements for private action under rule lOb-5).
123. See supra note 29 ("reckless or intentional" standard applies to justifiability of plaintiff's reliance).
124. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (when courts will impute knowledge to
plaintiffs for purposes of determining justifiability of plaintiffs' reliance).
125. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (plaintiff has lighter burden of proof
concerning justifiability of reliance when accurate information not available).
126. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (even when accurate information is not
available, plaintiff still must show reliance was justifiable).
127. See supra notes 88 & 117 and accompanying text (courts preclude plaintiffs' recovery
absent special circumstances demonstrating justifiable reliance).

